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THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS: CREATING AN  
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECOGNIZING 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
 





Until recently, with a few specialized exceptions, the United States 
was not a party to any treaties or agreements governing the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments.1 Generally, the lack of an 
international agreement has not caused problems for foreign parties 
seeking to enforce a judgment in the United States because U.S. courts 
employ a liberal approach to recognizing and enforcing foreign 
judgments.2 Other countries, however, do not extend the same 
treatment to U.S. judgments.3 
 
 
* Matthew B. Berlin is a J.D. candidate at American University’s Washington 
College of Law (2007). He earned his B.A. in International Relations at Tufts 
University.  
1 Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 167, 167–168 (1998); see also William W. Park, The Relative Reliability of 
Arbitration Agreements and Court Selection Clauses, in 14 INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 3, 8–9 (J.L. Goldsmith, ed., 
1997) (“[T]he United States is not a party to a single treaty providing for enforcement 
of judgments”); R. Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette, United States Practice 
Concerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16 INT’L L. 425, 427 (1982) 
(observing that the Convention Between the United Kingdom and the United States 
for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, 16 
I.L.M. 71 (1977), would have been the United States’ first treaty concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, if it had been agreed upon).  
2 See Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United 
States, 17 VA. J. INT’L L. 401, 401, 408–09 (1976–77) (arguing that the “constitutional 
necessity of giving effect to ‘foreign’ state judgments” probably led to a more 
generous approach in recognizing foreign state judgments as compared to the civil law 
systems of Europe). 
3 See ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Procedure, in THE 
FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: ENGLISH RESPONSES TO THE ALI/UNIDROIT 
DRAFT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 177, 204 (Mads 
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However, after more than ten years of negotiating a treaty 
governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the 
United States can finally celebrate. On June 30, 2005, the United 
States, along with the other sixty-four member states4 of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (Hague Conference), 
concluded the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(Hague Convention).5 Unfortunately, problems plagued negotiations 
from the beginning, making consensus on a larger convention seem 
impossible.6 But, instead of abandoning the project when disagreement 
threatened to end negotiations, the member states limited the Hague 
Convention’s scope to international cases between businesses that had 
agreed to a choice of forum7—an area already widely accepted 
internationally.8 In anticipation of U.S. acknowledgement of the 
Hague Convention (whether ratified or not), the American Law 
                                                                                                          
Andenas, Neil Andrews, Renato Nazzini eds., 2004) [hereinafter UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES] (emphasizing other countries’ disapproval of the U.S. concept of long-
arm and tag jurisdiction). 
4 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Member States, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) 
(providing a list of current member states, the date of their membership, and the 
agreements each has adopted). 
5 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded June 30, 2005, 44 
I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter Hague Convention].  
6 See, e.g., infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties 
faced by the Preliminary Draft Convention because of its expansive scope). Compare 
Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(1) (applying the Hague Convention in 
international cases to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or 
commercial matters), with Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission on 
Oct. 30, 1999, art.1(1) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft Convention] (stating that the 
Preliminary Draft Convention applies to civil and commercial matters generally). 
7 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(1)–(3), art. 2(1)(a) (setting forth 
which civil and commercial matters are included as well as those explicitly exempted 
from coverage under the Hague Convention). 
8 See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1, 16–20 (1972) (holding that a forum-
selection clause negotiated at arm’s length by experienced businessmen providing for 
the treatment of any disputes should be enforced by the courts in absence of some 
compelling and countervailing reason making enforcement unreasonable); Frank 
Vischer, Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses Under the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions and Under Swiss Law, in 14 INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE 
REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 73, 85 (J.L. Goldsmith ed., 1997) (expressing the 
European courts’ favorable treatment of forum-selection clauses and the lack of any 
provision in either the Brussels or Lugano Conventions permitting the courts to 
disregard such agreements). 
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Institute (ALI) has drafted a proposed federal statute9 to implement the 
Convention’s policies.10  
This comment focuses on the Hague Convention’s effect, not only 
on member states, but also on the United States’ domestic approach to 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Currently, U.S. 
jurisprudence on the subject is piecemeal at best, with each state 
adopting different standards.11 This comment argues that the United 
States should ratify the Hague Convention because it promotes U.S. 
interests abroad by allowing U.S. businesses to seek enforcement of 
judgments in foreign countries. Ratification will also create a single 
national standard for the treatment of foreign judgments that is similar 
to those standards currently used by state governments12 and consistent 
with the legal policy already in place.13 Furthermore, this comment 
argues that Congress should implement the Hague Convention through 
compatible legislation that mirrors the agreement rather than adding 
provisions that disagree with the majority of U.S. jurisprudence and 
render U.S. law incompatible with the Hague Convention, as the ALI 
proposes. 
Part II will discuss the background of U.S. law on forum-selection 
clauses and the current state of U.S. jurisprudence on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. Part II will 
also introduce the Hague Convention, past and present, to get a better 
sense of the Convention’s scope, followed by an examination of the 
ALI’s proposed federal statute.  
Part III will begin by analyzing the key provisions of the Hague 
Convention and the certainty they provide to the international business 
 
 
9 See generally American Law Institute, Publications Catalog, 
https://www.ali.org/ali/712.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (stating that the American 
Legal Institute has begun the task of drafting a separate federal statute in the case that 
the U. S. Senate does not ratify the Hague Convention).  
10 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
11 LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO LITIGATING 
HERE AND ABROAD 257–58 (1996).  
12 See discussion infra Part II. See generally United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324, 328–332 (1937) (delineating the distribution of power within the United States 
between the federal and state government, and affirming the exclusive control of the 
federal government over external affairs). 
13 See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; 
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby….”). 
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arena. Part III will then compare the United States’ approach to forum-
selection clauses with the Hague Convention’s obligatory treatment of 
choice of court agreements. Part III will also show that the Hague 
Convention does little more than codify U.S. law, especially because 
the choice of court agreement settles personal jurisdiction questions. 
Part III will then conclude with an analysis of the ALI’s proposed 
federal statute, arguing that the inclusion of reciprocity as a 
requirement for recognition is contrary to U.S. recognition 
jurisprudence and harmful to international trade. 
Part IV will recommend that the U.S. Senate ratify the Hague 
Convention, but will suggest that the U.S. Congress should refrain 
from adopting the ALI proposed federal statute as a model for 
implementing legislation. It also will argue that the United States 
should pursue bilateral negotiations with other nations after ratification 
to increase the acceptance of U.S. judgments abroad. 
 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 
A. U.S. Approach to Forum-Selection Clauses 
 
Until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bremen v. Zapata,14 
U.S. courts typically refused to recognize forum-selection clauses as 
dispositive.15 In Bremen, the Court decided that forum-selection 
clauses would be dispositive, absent a showing of unreasonableness. 
The Court apparently reasoned that parties to an international business 
contract16 want to avoid uncertainty by including such clauses after 
 
 
14 Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
15 See Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174, 183–85 (1856) (nullifying 
the effect of a forum-selection clause in an insurance contract because disturbing the 
symmetry of law by upsetting the rules regarding jurisdiction was against public 
policy); Harold G. Maier, The U.S. Supreme Court and the “User-Friendly” Forum-
selection clause: The Effect of Carnival Cruise Lines on International Contracts, in 14 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 53, 56–
57 (J.L. Goldsmith, ed. 1997) (relying on Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing 
& Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963), and Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 
85 (1955), to argue that the judiciary, as an “arm of the sovereign,” could not permit 
private persons to determine where suits could or could not be brought). 
16 See Park, supra note 1, at 4–8 (discussing the international business person’s 
fear of biased foreign courts, strange legal practices, and unenforceable judgments to 
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negotiating a contract at arm’s length,17 and insert forum-selection 
clauses to avoid uncertainty in the litigation forum. After the Court’s 
decision in Bremen, the Court let the circuits define “reasonableness,” 
but the circuits disagreed about whether to apply federal or state 
substantive law to choice of court agreements.18 Federal courts enforce 
forum-selection agreements,19 but the extent to which federal courts 
would enforce such agreements was unclear until Carnival Cruise 
Lines v. Shute.20 
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Supreme Court upheld a forum-
selection clause between the consumer-petitioner and Carnival Cruise 
Lines because a form passage contract stipulating the resolution of all 
disputes in Florida was reasonable even though it required a petitioner 
from Washington to bring a claim in Florida. The Court reasoned that 
passengers who purchase tickets that include a forum-selection clause 
should be bound to such contracts because they benefit from lower 
prices as a result of the cruise line’s ability to lower operating costs by 
stipulating a forum for litigation in the passage contract.21 The Court 
noted, however, that courts would only enforce reasonable forum-
selection clauses.22 
Courts have looked at several factors when determining if a 
forum-selection clause is reasonable. These factors include the 
following: (1) the identity of the law which governs the contract; (2) 
the place of execution of the contract; (3) the place of performance; (4) 
the availability of remedies in the enumerated forum; (5) the public 
policy of the chosen forum state; (6) the location of the parties, 
witnesses, and evidence; (7) the relative bargaining power of the 
parties when the forum was chosen; (8) the use of fraud, undue 
                                                                                                          
highlight the reason that the majority of business managers will either elect to settle 
disputes through arbitration or agree to submit to a particular jurisdiction). 
17 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12–14. 
18 Park, supra note 1, at 10. 
19 See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31–32 (1988) 
(affirming the enforcement of a forum-selection clause). But see Park, supra note 1, at 
9 (stating that, from a state perspective, only New York treats forum-selection clauses 
as dispositive). See generally N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-1402 (2006) (elaborating New 
York law on the enforcement of forum-selection clauses).  
20 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
21 Id. at 594. 
22 Id. at 595. 
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influence, or other extenuating circumstances; and (9) the conduct of 
the parties.23   
Typically, if a U.S. federal court finds that a forum-selection 
clause is reasonable, the court will honor it by granting a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the action or stay proceedings until the court in the 
forum of choice renders a judgment.24 
 
B. U.S. Approach to Recognizing Foreign Judgments 
 
Although U.S. federal courts have enforced international forum-
selection clauses since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bremen, they 
have not developed a unified approach when it comes to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.25 Until it signed the 
Hague Convention, the United States, with a few special exceptions,26 
was not party to any treaty governing the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments.27 Furthermore, Congress has never passed a law 
dictating when federal courts should recognize foreign judgments. 
 
 
23 E.g., D’Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F.Supp. 708, 715–16 
(D.R.I. 1983).  
24 See, e.g., id. (upholding a forum-selection clause between two businesses after 
the defendant, who had successfully removed the case from state superior court, 
moved to transfer venue from the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island to the District 
Court for the Southern District of California because the defendant failed to prove that 
the forum was unreasonable). But see Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 481–482 (Tex. 
App. 1997) (recognizing that provisions of a forum-selection clause, like any other 
contractual right, can be waived).  
25 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 (1987) 
(asserting that the prevalent statutory and common law on the matter of recognition 
and enforcement generally separates the process into two steps: recognition followed 
by enforcement); see also Willis L. M. Reese, Status in this Country of Judgments 
Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 788 (1950) (discussing the value of a 
national standard as opposed to current inconsistent state standards). 
26 The United States joined the international community in regulating the 
enforcement of arbitral awards when it acceded to the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in 1970. See 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (mandating that members States must 
recognize and enforce a decision between parties to arbitrate disputes, as well as treat 
arbitral awards as binding, and enforce them in accordance with the applicable rules of 
procedure). 
27 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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Congress’ inaction has left the decision of whether to recognize and 
enforce foreign judgments to the federal courts. 
 
1. Recognition under federal common law 
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court established the basis of federal 
common law policy for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments when it ruled against French foreign judgment creditors in 
Hilton v. Guyot.28 The Court relied on comity and reciprocity as the 
major factors in determining whether it should give force to the 
foreign judgment.29 The Court noted that comity is neither an 
obligation imposed upon States nor is it a display of courtesy between 
them, but it is the recognition that one nation gives to the acts of 
another government as consideration to the nation’s international duty 
and the rights of its citizens.30 
The Court continued by enumerating a more specific list of factors 
that a foreign judgment should meet before becoming enforceable. 
First, the judgment must be the result of a fair trial in a court of 
competent jurisdiction within a judicial system that will not 
discriminate against citizens of other countries.31 A judgment obtained 
through fraud will not satisfy these conditions.32 Second, the defendant 
must either receive due notification of the suit or appear voluntarily.33 
While finding that the French judgment met these requirements, 
the Court declined to recognize the judgment due to a lack of 
 
 
28 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
29 See id. at 143–44, 168; see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF INT’L LAW AND 
PRACTICE, ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED 
STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 3 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992) [hereinafter AM. BAR 
ASS’N SECTION OF INT’L LAW AND PRACTICE] (granting that most courts begin with a 
comity analysis as enunciated by Hilton even though state law is supposed to be 
controlling); see also Reese, supra note 25, at 790 (examining Hilton in order to detail 
the history of the reciprocity requirement in the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments because it remains the “most detailed exposition” of the controlling 
principles).  
30 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64 (defining comity, the Supreme Court asserted that 
recognition and enforcement was a matter of public international law). 
31 See id. at 123.  
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 201 (contemplating the international use of comity and the 
requirements set forth by other countries to announce the set of factors U.S. comity 
analyses would consider). 
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reciprocity,34 meaning that France would not have enforced a U.S. 
judgment under the same circumstances. The federal common law 
approach has not changed a great deal since Hilton, but a majority of 
the circuits and states no longer apply the reciprocity requirement in 
the recognition process.35   
Hilton dealt with the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments as a matter of public international law, but this is not 
surprising considering the decision’s lengthy discussion of comity. 
Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique changed all of this 
in 1926.36 The New York Court of Appeals held that the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments was a matter of state law. The 
effect of Johnston increased with the decision in Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, which nullified Hilton’s effect by eliminating the federal 
common law.37 These cases, therefore, have eliminated the national 
standard for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and left 
 
 
34 See id. at 227–29. 
35 See, e.g., Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (D. Del. 1991) 
(interpreting the Delaware Supreme Court’s criticism of the reciprocity rule in Bata v. 
Bata, 163 A.2d 493 (Del. 1960), to mean that Delaware no longer required reciprocity 
as a prerequisite to recognition of a foreign judgment). While Delaware recognition 
law mirrored Hilton, Mata, 771 F. Supp. at 1382, Delaware adopted the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act in 1997, 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 
4801–08 (2005). Freidrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 33 (1988) (noting that the reciprocity 
requirement established in Hilton became obsolete as the recognition process became 
state-centered because an increasing number of states continued to adopt the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Act that omits that requirement). 
36 See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 
(N.Y. 1926) (holding that that it was the settled law of New York that a foreign 
judgment is conclusive upon the merits). The court held that foreign judgments can 
only be impeached by proof that the court in which it was rendered did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or 
that a decision was procured by means of fraud. Id. 
37 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also AM. BAR ASS’N 
SECTION OF INT’L LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 7 (explaining the effects of 
Erie in that it created four different sources of law for federal district courts: (1) 
enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act, (2) prior state court 
decisions, (3) prior federal court decisions saying what law the state would have 
applied, and (4) state statutes or case law requiring the court to reference sources 
outside the state); Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 
1003 (5th Cir. 1990) (construing Erie in a recognition and enforcement proceeding in 
Texas of an Abu Dhabi judgment to require the application of state law in the 
proceeding). 
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the states to decide how and when they would deal with foreign 
judgments. 
 
2. Effects of U.S. jurisprudence on recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments 
 
As a result of the Court’s decisions in Johnston and Erie, foreign 
lawyers and their clients have trouble deciding where to seek 
recognition of a foreign judgment in the United States because the 
requirements vary from forum to forum. Some states still require 
reciprocity from the country of origin.38 However, the situation is more 
difficult for parties seeking to enforce a U.S. judgment abroad.39 When 
the enforcing court requires reciprocity from the original U.S. court, 
American judgment creditors40 carry the burden of proving that 
reciprocity exists in the state or district court that decided the case. 41   
Luckily, most states have either followed the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law, which closely mirrors the federal common 
law standard adopted in Hilton, or have adopted some form of the 
 
 
38 See TEITZ, supra note 11, at 273 (1996) (articulating the usefulness of 
maintaining reciprocity as a defense in the seven states that still require it). 
39 See British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (characterizing the application of comity to foreign judgments as a 
relatively simple matter except in cases where the country’s judgments are “the result 
of outrageous departures from our own notions of civilized jurisprudence”); see also 
Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2000) (elaborating on the 
evidence produced by Citibank, which included U.S. State Department Country 
reports, used to prove that the Liberian judicial system was in a state of chaos and 
failed to meet due process standards at the time of their trial). Citibank’s evidence 
persuaded the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court’s decision to 
reject the judgment creditor’s motion for summary judgment and grant summary 
judgment sua sponte in favor of Citibank. Id. at 139–43. 
40 In this comment “judgment creditor” denotes a party that has successfully 
litigated a case and has been awarded a money-judgment. The party is a creditor in the 
sense that the judgment imposes an obligation on the opposing party to pay the 
judgment. Conversely, a judgment debtor is another name for the defendant in the 
original action against whom the court ruled. 
41 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 167–68 (1895) (addressing the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments for the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court 
crafted a rule based on comity); see also TEITZ, supra note 11, at 253, 257 (restating 
that the common law approach to recognition and enforcement is based on the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Hilton).  
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Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act.42 In fact, a quick comparison 
of the three bodies of law shows that they are not that different.43 
  
3. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act and the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
(Restatement),44 which mirrors federal common law, and the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Act are very similar to each other, but with 
one major exception.45 The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act,46 
as suggested by its name, governs only the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign money judgments, while the Restatement 
covers the recognition and enforcement of any type of foreign 
judgment.47 Although the Restatement embodies the approach of many 
states with slight variations, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act has been more successful in creating a single 
 
 
42 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, United States of America, in 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 123 (Charles Platto & William G. 
Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993) (admitting that while no federal law governs the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments, the practice among the 50 states does not vary 
widely). 
43 See id. at 124 (insisting that the practice of recognizing foreign judgments 
does not differ a great deal among the 50 states, partly because of the reliance upon 
common law); see also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 
2000) (overlooking the district court’s incorrect decision to apply New York law 
instead of the federal standard because the fundamental similarities removed any 
chances of that decision having a material effect on the outcome); discussion infra part 
III.B (grouping the three approaches together because of their similarities for the 
purposes of comparing the Hague Convention with current U.S. law in order to 
illustrate their minor differences, and to encourage ratification of the Hague 
Convention). 
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–83 (1987). 
45 See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF INT’L LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 
10 (observing that the Uniform Recognition Act and the Restatement “codify the 
comity analysis” of Hilton, and, in general, provide the same grounds for refusing to 
recognize foreign judgments). By comparing the two on the chart provided, it becomes 
clear that the only major distinction is the inclusion of the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction as mandatory grounds for non-recognition under the Uniform Recognition 
Act, while the Restatement treats it as discretionary. Id. 
46 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 274 (1986). 
47 See id. § 1(2) (defining “foreign judgment” as any judgment of a foreign 
country for a sum of money). 
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approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign money 
judgments.48 More simply, the Restatement’s approach has slowly 
given way to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act’s approach.49 
Both sources require that the judgment for which the parties seek 
recognition be final,50 but allow a stay in the proceedings if the foreign 
judgment is under appeal.51 The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act and the Restatement also require the non-recognition 
of foreign judgments when there is a lack of due process or when the 
originating court lacked personal jurisdiction.52 They differ slightly, 
however, over the question of subject matter jurisdiction. The Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act makes the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction a mandatory reason for non-recognition while the 
Restatement makes it optional.53   
 
 
48 See infra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that thirty-two of the fifty 
states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act).  
49 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4801–08 (1997) (codifying the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act for use in Delaware). Thirty-two states 
have adopted the UFMJRA in some form, twelve of which have joined since 1990. 
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 264 (1986). 
50 See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT § 2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. e (1986).  
51 See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF INT’L LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 
10 (illustrating the approach of the UFMJRA and the Restatement with regard to the 
requirement of finality in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments).  
52 See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(1)–(2); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(1)(a)–(b); see also Somportex 
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1972) (refusing to 
accept a due process complaint against an English default judgment because of the 
rule from Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947), in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that a default judgment would be treated just as judgment on the merits when the 
defendant is afforded proper notice). But see Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 480 
(Tex. App. 1997) (indicating that the due process exception of the Texas Uniform 
Foreign Country Money-Judgment Act does not require that the procedures taken in 
the foreign country, in this case, Australia, be identical to those established in the 
United States). The court also prohibited the judgment debtor from attacking the 
Australian judgment on a matter already litigated, holding that “grounds for non-
recognition may be waived” if a party fails to assert the defense in the original 
proceeding despite the opportunity to do so. Id.  
53 See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(3); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(a) (“A court in the United 
States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if the court that 
rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.”). 
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The Restatement lists the following six discretionary grounds for 
non-recognition: (1) the foreign court lacks jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the case, (2) the defendant is unable to defend the 
case due to insufficient notice, (3) either party uses fraud to obtain the 
judgment, (4) the cause of action is repugnant to U.S. public policy, 
(5) the foreign judgment conflicts with another judgment entitled to 
recognition, and (6) the judgment was rendered in a court contrary to 
an agreement between the parties to litigate in a particular forum.54 
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act allows courts to 
consider six factors as well, but they vary slightly from those listed in 
the Restatement.55 The most notable of these differences is the 
inclusion of forum non conveniens56 in the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Act’s list of discretionary factors.57 While both of these 
sources are widely used, it is important to remember that each state 
 
 
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(a)–(f) (1987). 
55 See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §4(b)(1)–(6) 
(holding that subject matter jurisdiction is required, not optional, and permitting denial 
of recognition when “the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial 
of the action”); see also Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 236–37, 238 n.12 
(Md. 1997) (employing § 10-704 of the Maryland Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, which specifies that a foreign judgment may be refused recognition 
when the cause of action upon which it is based is repugnant to the public policy of the 
state, to deny recognition to a British libel judgment). But see Ackerman v. Levine, 
788 F.2d 830, 842–43 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasizing that the public policy exception to 
the recognition of foreign judgments should be construed narrowly, especially when it 
is possible to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment based on a cause of action that 
does not exist in the United States); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 
169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1999) (reiterating that recognition of a foreign judgment in 
Texas will not be denied on public policy grounds unless it would significantly 
conflict with Texas law). The court continues by saying that the narrowness of the 
public policy exception results from a compromise between the principles of res 
judicata and fairness to litigants. Id. 
56 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (holding that courts can 
use a forum non conveniens motion to deny a plaintiff’s forum choice). Courts claim 
that it increases judicial efficiency and decreases inconvenience to the parties, but 
opponents of forum non conveniens argue that foreign plaintiffs typically bring cases 
against corporate defendants with ties to the United States, so the United States has a 
substantial interest in adjudicating these disputes. John R. Wilson, Comment, Coming 
to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in 
Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 662 (2004). 
57 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(6). 
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can modify the approach it chooses.58 For example, some of the states 
following the Restatement’s approach also require reciprocity, even 
though the majority of them feel that they no longer need it.59 
 
C. Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements 
 
The United States persuaded the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law to begin working on a convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the early 1990s.60 
The Preliminary Draft Convention included a broader scope than the 
Hague Convention, and had aspirations of becoming the larger 
international cousin of the Brussels61 and Lugano Conventions.62 The 
 
 
58 Cf. id., Commissioner’s Prefatory Note (requesting states to adopt the 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act because codification will 
increase the likelihood that foreign courts will recognize state judgments).  
59 See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (construing federal 
and District of Columbia law to no longer require reciprocity). The court, in line with 
this comment, also suggests that any type of reciprocity requirement should be applied 
nationally because any decision regarding the effect of a foreign nation’s scrutiny of a 
U.S. decision is political in nature. Id. See also In re Colo. Corp. v. Lam, 531 F.2d 
463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976) (finding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 
denying comity to the orders of a foreign court when no evidence was presented on 
whether a U.S. judgment would be granted comity). The appellant’s failure to prove 
that Luxembourg and Netherlands Antilles would grant comity to U.S. judgments was 
made immaterial by the appellee’s failure to prove the lack of comity. Id. 
Interestingly, the court in In re Colo. Corp. was not questioning whether to grant 
comity on the basis of reciprocity in Luxembourg and Netherlands Antilles, but the 
lack of reciprocity in Canada. Id. at 468. The court acknowledged that reciprocity was 
a concern, but concluded that denying comity on such grounds was a “misdirected use 
of the reciprocity consideration.” Id. 
60 See Hugh F. Bangasser & Toussant Myricks, Procedural Aspects of 
International Civil Litigation: Selected Issues Relating to Service of Process, Foreign 
Discovery for U.S. Litigation and Enforcement of Judgments, in INTRODUCTION TO 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL TRANSACTIONS 1, 17 (Marylin J. Raisch & Roberta I. Shaffer 
eds., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1995) (articulating the United States’ willingness in 
becoming a signatory to a convention covering the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in its proposal to the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law in May of 1992).  
61 Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC). 
62 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Setting the Stage, in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE HELD AT NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW ON THE PROPOSED CONVENTION 1, 3 (Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman eds., 2001) (proffering that the Hague Convention 
drew inspiration from the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention just as 
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Preliminary Draft Convention covered international litigation 
involving civil and commercial matters, except those proscribed by 
paragraph two of article one,63 which includes tort actions and 
consumer contracts.64 However, the project was put on hold because of 
major disagreements over jurisdictional issues,65 and the Hague 
Convention was subsequently trimmed down, giving the courts of 
member States jurisdiction over “international cases to exclusive 
choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial 
matters.”66 
                                                                                                          
they drew inspiration from the U.S. Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also Hague 
Conference on Private Int’l Law, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, at 8, Prelim. Doc. No. 7 (Apr. 1997) (drawn up by 
Catherine Kessedjian), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf (examining the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions’ successful recognition and enforcement schemes to 
illustrate that the Preliminary Draft Convention should continue to embody the 
principles of a double convention.  Why? Because defining the direct jurisdiction of 
courts in member States is as important to reaching a meaningful agreement as 
establishing a consensus on the effects of that judgment in the territory of the other 
member States). 
63 See Prelimary Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 1, ¶ 2 (removing the status 
and legal capacity of persons, matrimonial property regimes, wills and succession, 
insolvency, social security, arbitration and related proceedings, and admiralty and 
maritime matters from the scope of the Preliminary Draft Convention); see also id. art. 
1, ¶ 1 (excluding revenue, customs, and administrative matters from the scope of the 
Preliminary Draft Convention). 
64 See id. arts. 7, 10 (creating jurisdiction for a court to hear tort and personal 
contract cases when the court resides in the same State in which the occurrence giving 
rise to the tort action occurred, and/or personal contract cases where the consumer 
took the steps necessary to conclude the contract in the State of the court where the 
suit is brought). 
65 See Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, at 4, Prelim. Doc. No. 26 (Dec. 2004) 
(prepared by Trevor C. Hartley & Masato Dogauchi), http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
wop/jdgm_pd26e.pdf [hereinafter Draft Report] (noting that the 1999 Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
was abandoned because its expansive scope made reaching an agreement seemingly 
impossible); see also Mehren, supra note 2, at 192 (introducing a letter from Jeffrey 
Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser and Head of the U.S. Delegation, to the Secretary 
General of the Conference, which decried the current negotiation method and its 
inability to address serious defects in the Preliminary Draft Convention, in order to 
illustrate the United States’ unease with proceeding in scheduling the next step for the 
Preliminary Draft Convention).  
66 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. 
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The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements consists 
of a number of key articles that can be broken down for clarity.67 
Articles one and two establish the scope of the Hague 
Convention.68 Article one states that the convention shall cover 
international cases involving choice of court agreements in civil or 
commercial matters.69 Article two, on the other hand, is proscriptive. It 
removes a list of civil or commercial subjects that some nations could 
consider, such as anti-trust matters, insolvency, employment contracts, 
tort claims, and personal contracts. This provision narrowed the focus 
of the Hague Convention to subject matter upon which the members of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law could agree. 
Notably, this included business contracts to which a State was a 
party.70 Paragraph five of article two includes a provision that 
expressly permits suits against foreign sovereigns by businesses from 
other countries. 
Article three is important in that it sets forth the requirements that 
govern the choice of court agreement and includes factors that will 
have an appreciable impact on companies involved in international 
contracting. 
Article five states that a court or forum chosen in a choice of court 
agreement shall have jurisdiction over the dispute.71 Paragraph two of 
 
 
67 See id. at art. 7 (excluding interim measures from the scope of the 
Convention); see also Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Comments from the 
United States of America on the December 2004 Report on the Preliminary Draft 
Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, at 5, Prelim. Doc. No. 29 
Addendum 1 (June 2005), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd29_add.pdf 
(responding to the draft report, the U.S. delegation stated that in order to best 
understand the Hague Convention, the report should begin with an overview of articles 
five, seven (now six), and nine, as opposed to beginning with article one).  
68 See infra notes 69, 70 (elaborating on articles 1 and 2 of the Hague 
Convention). 
69 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 1; see also Draft Report, supra note 65, 
¶ 63 (asserting that while the Hague Convention will predominantly affect the original 
parties to the agreement, it will, in some cases, bind third parties when their right to 
bring the proceedings depends on an assignment from one of the original parties). 
70 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(5) (allowing application of the Hague 
Convention to States). But see Draft Report, supra note 65, ¶¶ 58–60 (narrowing the 
application of the Hague convention to those instances when a State is party. Those 
instances being when a State is exercising powers similar to those of private 
individuals; this avoids interference with governmental immunity). 
71 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(1). 
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article five, however, warrants special attention because it proscribes 
the use of forum non conveniens to thwart the choice of court 
agreement. It reads, “A court that has jurisdiction under paragraph one 
shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute 
should be decided in a court of another State.”72   
Article six establishes a second set of obligations equally as 
important. It requires courts not selected by the choice of court 
agreement to suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive 
choice of court agreement applies. This requirement is waived when 
any of the four following conditions are met: (1) the agreement is null 
and void under the law of the State of the chosen court; (2) one of the 
parties lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of 
the State seized; (3) dismissing the proceedings would lead to injustice 
or contradict the law of the State seized; or (4) the court chosen by the 
parties to hear the case has refused.73   
Articles eight and nine move from the jurisdictional issues covered 
in earlier articles to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments resulting from choice of court jurisdiction.74 Article eight 
requires the courts to enforce the judgment without reviewing the 
merits of the case where a judgment creditor has filed suit, unless the 
foreign judgment was a default judgment.75 Article nine, on the other 
hand, lists seven reasons why a court of a member State could deny 
 
 
72 Id. art. 5(2). 
73 Id. art. 6.  
74 Id. art. 8(1)–(5).  
75 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 8 (allowing courts to review 
judgments on the merits in cases they are being asked to recognize when the rendering 
court’s judgment is based on a default by one of the parties); id. art. 14 (allowing 
States that have ratified the Hague Convention to establish separate procedures for 
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments within their nation so long as they act 
expeditiously); see also MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 52 A. 982, 985, 987 
(N.H. 1902) (holding that a judgment on the merits, in an action for a loss instituted 
and litigated to its conclusion in a Canadian court of general jurisdiction having 
jurisdiction of the parties, was a conclusive defense to a subsequent action for the 
same loss instituted in New Hampshire, regardless of whether the stipulation against 
liability was void or not under the laws of New Hampshire). The concept of res 
judicata has been applied to foreign judgments by U.S. courts for quite a long time in 
certain areas of the law. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 42, at 123, 126, 132. U.S. 
courts have also accepted the use of foreign judgments as a defense against new 
claims, giving life to the collateral estoppel effect of foreign judgments. Reese, supra 
note 25, at 788. 
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the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment from a court in 
another member State.76 These factors include the invalidity of the 
choice of court agreement, a party’s incapacity to conclude such an 
agreement, insufficient service to the judgment debtor, fraud, and 
instances where recognizing the foreign judgment is incompatible with 
public policy of the requested State.77  
The remaining articles of the Hague Convention, such as 
provisions for the severability of the choice of court agreement, 
transitional application, and the inclusion of regional economic 
integration organizations like the European Union, are important but 
do not merit inclusion here because they deal more with the procedural 
aspects of the Hague Convention as opposed to the substantive issues 
of jurisdiction and recognition.78 
 
D. ALI Proposed Federal Statute 
 
The ALI began preparing a proposed statute for the U.S. Congress 
to implement the convention in the event that the President signed the 
treaty and the Senate ratified it.79 The ALI was forced to change focus 
when the original convention was scrapped by the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, and then replaced with the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.80 The ALI continued 
work on the project but decided to draft a statute that Congress could 
adopt even in the absence of a Hague Convention.81  
 
 
76 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 9(a)–(g) (using “may” to condition 
the decision to apply any of the factors listed as opposed to “shall” or “must”). 
77 See id. (enumerating factors that a court can consider in determining whether a 
foreign judgment should be recognized, including two possibilities in which the 
foreign judgment in question would be inconsistent with a prior judgment between the 
parties in the same State, or inconsistent with a prior judgment from a different State 
that fulfills the requirements for recognition in the requested State). 
78 Id. arts. 15, 16, 29.  
79 See George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 
1995) 71, 85–88 (iterating that U.S. courts have established that federal statutes and 
self-executing treaties are of equal status, but, in practice, implementing legislation is 
required because Congress finds most treaties to be non-self-executing). 
80 See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
81 See Lance Liebman, Foreword to AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE, 
xi (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (emphasizing that the ALI project on the recognition 
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The ALI proposed statute is notable for two reasons: (1) it retains 
a scope similar to that of the Preliminary Draft Convention,82 and (2) it 
imposes a reciprocity requirement.83 However, the future of the ALI 
proposed statute and its impact upon federal legislation are uncertain. 
Although members of the ALI approved the proposed final draft at the 
82nd Annual Meeting, held from May 16–18, 2005, despite motions to 
quash the project,84 the Hague Convention was not signed until June 
30, 2005.85 The ALI apparently foresaw the problem of drafting a 
proposed federal statute because it amended the introduction of the 
proposed final draft while negotiations within the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law were still underway.86 The introduction 
now states that the proposed statute “serves as a concrete expression” 
of the ALI’s stance on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 





Even though the Hague Convention is limited in scope compared 
to the Preliminary Draft Convention, the United States should ratify it 
                                                                                                          
and enforcement of foreign judgments would continue despite roadblocks at the Hague 
Conference in order to present a model federal statute for Congress to adopt).  
82 FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 1(a) (Proposed 
Final Draft 2005) [hereinafter FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT] (providing that the Act shall 
apply to all foreign judgments other than judgments for divorce, support, maintenance, 
division of property, custody, adoption, other matters of domestic relations, 
bankruptcy, liquidation, and foreign arbitral awards).  
83 Id. § 7 (resurrecting the reciprocity requirement imposed in Hilton by allowing 
judgment debtors to use the lack of reciprocity as a defense as long as they can prove 
there is substantial doubt that the courts of the state of origin would enforce a 
comparable U.S. judgment).  
84 AM. LAW INST., ACTIONS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO DRAFTS SUBMITTED AT 
2005 ANNUAL MEETING 6, https://www.ali.org/ali/AM05ActionsTaken.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2006) (disregarding a motion to reject the statute and approving the 
proposed final statute as amended). 
85 Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
86 AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 6 (Amended Proposed Final Draft 2005). 
87 Am. Law Inst., Members OK Bylaw Amendment, Approve Final Drafts for 
Agency Restatement and Foreign Judgments Project, A.L.I. REP., Summer 2005, at 2, 
available at https://www.ali.org/ali/R2704_03-OKBylaw.htm (confirming ALI’s 
position that the final proposed statute would serve as an important guide in the 
legislative and judicial process, even if it’s never adopted by Congress). 
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for two reasons: (1) the Hague Convention will create certainty in the 
United States with regards to dispute resolution within the 
international business arena,88 and (2) adopting the Hague Convention 
as a national standard for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments 
would not require a drastic change from the United States’ current 
approach.89 The United States will not achieve these benefits, 
however, if it implements the Hague Convention by adopting the 
ALI’s proposed statute and its requirement of reciprocity. 
 
A. Creating Certainty in the International Business Arena 
 
The Hague Convention creates certainty in the international 
business arena in several different ways. First, the Hague Convention’s 
scope is clearly defined. Article one states that the Hague Convention 
is limited to exclusive choice of court agreements in international 
cases involving civil or commercial matters. Article two contains 
further limiting language that makes the scope of the Hague 
Convention even clearer. By setting forth more than fifteen areas that 
are expressly exempted from the Hague Convention, article two 
prevents inconsistency of coverage between signatory States by 
preventing them from disputing the civil or commercial nature of 
certain areas of the law such as anti-trust matters,90 insolvency,91 and 
the carriage of passengers and goods. These exclusions most likely 
represent the areas in which earlier international agreements have been 
 
 
88 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Triumph of Substance Over Rules of Choice in 
International Commercial Transactions: From the Lex Mercatoria to Modern 
Standards, in INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL TRANSACTIONS 139–40 
(Marylin J. Raisch & Roberta I. Shaffer eds., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1995) 
(criticizing the current approach of U.S. courts in resolving choice of law problems in 
disputes arising from international business transactions because such a stance 
jeopardizes business interests in the billions of dollars); see also discussion infra Part 
III.A (assessing the impact of the Hague Convention’s provisions on international 
business).   
89 See discussion infra Part III.C (comparing and contrasting the Hague 
Convention with the three current U.S. approaches to the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments). 
90 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(2)(h) (prohibiting the inclusion of 
antitrust matters). 
91 Id. art. 2(2)(e). 
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reached,92 as well as the States’ unwillingness to compromise 
important national concerns.93 
Article two further imposes three important limitations, not 
mentioned in the list, that emphasize the nature and extent of the 
Hague Convention’s commitment to creating certainty within the 
international business arena with respect to the litigation of disputes in 
a chosen forum.94 Paragraph three of article two mitigates paragraph 
two’s list of exclusions, and prevents civil or commercial cases from 
exclusion because of preliminary matters included on paragraph two’s 
list.95 Paragraph four of article two, on the other hand, acts as an 
equalizer by excluding arbitration proceedings, an area governed by 
the New York Convention.96  
Paragraph five of article two is the true indicator, however, of the 
contracting States’ commitment to the success of the Hague 
Convention.97 It includes a provision that expressly permits suits 
against foreign sovereigns by businesses from other countries. This is 
crucial to the Hague Convention’s success because a great number of 
international contracts involve national governments.98 Excluding 
national governments from the scope of the treaty would cause 
 
 
92 Compare id., art. 2(2) (excluding maintenance obligations from the Hague 
Convention), with Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
Relating to Maintenance Obligations, Port.-Czech.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1973, 1021 
U.N.T.S. 15001 (establishing common provisions to govern the reciprocal recognition 
and enforcement of decisions relating to maintenance obligations of adults).  
93 See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Rouche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158–
69 (2004) (interpreting the Sherman and Clayton Acts in conjunction with the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 to establish the U.S. position on allowing 
suits against U.S. businesses for violations of U.S. antitrust laws, which precluded 
claims, in this instance, against a U.S. business for actions that adversely affected only 
foreign markets). 
94 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(3)–(6) (ensuring that government 
contracts in civil or commercial capacity are not exempted from inclusion, allowing 
any of the issues listed as reason for exclusion in section two of article two to be duly 
considered within the Hague Convention’s scope so long as they are preliminary 
matters, and removing arbitration from the Hague Convention). 
95 Id. art. 2(3).  
96 Id. art. 2(4). 
97 Id. art. 2(5) (dismissing sovereign immunity claims for government contracts 
in civil and commercial matters).  
98 E.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. Tex. 1980) 
(denying the res judicata effect of an English judgment against a U.S. business whose 
assets were appropriated by Libya). 
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corporations contracting with those governments to rely on arbitration 
clauses instead of the Hague Convention, depriving the Hague 
Convention of a chance to reach maximum efficiency.99 
In article three, the Hague Convention further creates certainty by 
defining the requirement for choice of court agreements. The first 
section of article three defines an exclusive choice of court agreement, 
while section (c) sets forth how an exclusive choice of court agreement 
concludes.100 Section (b) states that a choice of court agreement gives 
exclusive jurisdiction to the chosen forum,101 and section (d) states that 
exclusive choice of court agreements are independent of other 
contractual terms.102 These provisions provide international businesses 
with the necessary information to write an exclusive choice of court 
agreement enforceable through the Hague Convention. 
Articles five and six embody the core of the Hague Convention’s 
treatment of forum-selection clauses.103 The jurisdictional clause for 
the court named in the choice of court agreement is the bedrock of the 
Hague Convention, but it is unquestionably augmented by the explicit 
proscription of forum non conveniens as a defense to the agreement, as 
well as article six’s requirement that courts not chosen as the forum of 
choice refrain from hearing the case. If parties to a choice of court 
agreement were allowed to bring a case in any court of their choice, or 
if they undermine the choice of court agreement by moving to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens, 104 the effectiveness of the Hague 
 
 
99 Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, The Future Convention on Exclusive 
Choice of Court Agreements and Arbitration, at 4, Prelim. Doc. No. 32 (June 2005) 
(prepared by Andrea Schulz), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd32e.pdf 
(indicating that a majority of parties to international contracts enter into arbitration 
agreements). 
100 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(c)(i)–(ii) (requiring a choice of 
court agreement to be in writing, but allowing it to consist of any method “which 
renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference”). 
101 See id. art. 3(b) (providing that a choice of court agreement that specifies a 
court, or the courts of a contracting State, is presumed to be exclusive). 
102 See id. art. 3(d).  
103 Tycho H.E. Stahl, Problems with the United States Anti-Dumping Law: The 
Case for Reform of the Constructed Value Methodology, 11 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1 
(1993) (discussing the advantages that large multinational corporations have over 
smaller, less experienced international firms in international business contracts 
because of their ability to retain permanent legal staff). 
104 See Draft Report, supra note 65, at 22–23 paras. 91–97 (explaining that the 
Hague Convention does not preclude transfer of the proceedings from one court in the 
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Convention would be seriously limited.105 In this respect, the two 
provisions are mutually required for the Hague Convention to achieve 
any degree of success. What remains to be determined, however, is the 
effect of cases filed in the courts of States that are not members of the 
Hague Convention. Article seven may provide a degree of relief for 
parties under the burden of dual proceedings in the courts of a member 
State and a non-member State, but there is no guarantee that a court of 
a non-member State would give any effect to the judicial order of the 
court chosen in the original agreement.106 
The Hague Convention’s goal of ensuring the mobility of 
judgments in commercial or civil matters rests upon the language of 
articles 8 and 9.107 Although these two articles specify which 
judgments will be recognized and enforced,108 they do not mention 
whether third parties can use a foreign judgment’s preclusive effect as 
a defense in a separate suit.109 If res judicata does apply for a foreign 
judgment, it would lead to greater certainty for international 
                                                                                                          
chosen forum to another in the same forum. But where a choice of court agreement 
lists the courts of a state, transfer of the proceeding to a different State would be 
precluded by the Hague Convention); see also Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 
3(b) (considering a choice of court agreement that lists the courts of one State as 
presumptively exclusive).  
105 See generally Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Note on the Question 
of “Forum Non Conveniens” in the Perspective of a Double Convention on Judicial 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Decisions, Prelim. Doc. 3 (Apr. 1996) (drawn up 
by the Permanent Bureau), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd03(1996).pdf 
(arguing for the removal of forum non conveniens as a method of undermining the 
Hague Convention). 
106 See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (noting that nations are 
not obligated to uphold or enforce the judicial actions of other nations even though 
comity strongly supports respecting foreign decisions). 
107 Hague Convention, supra note 5, arts. 8–9; see Katherine R. Miller, 
Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing A Reciprocity Requirement into 
U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 312 
(2004) (stressing the importance of a “stable legal infrastructure” for the “rapid and 
predictable recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments” because of its impact 
on the pace of trade and foreign investment). Businesses are driven by profit. By 
removing the hidden costs of legal systems, especially the cost of re-litigating a 
dispute, such profit determinations would be less complicated, and hopefully spur an 
increase in the pace of international trade. Id.  
108 See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining that articles 8 and 9 contain 
provisions for refusing recognition of a foreign judgment based on the jurisdiction 
created by previous articles). 
109 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1–15 (neglecting to include a 
provision on the ability of third parties to enforce foreign judgments). 
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businesses facing suit in a number of different contracting States. 
Articles eight and nine are successful to the extent that they ensure a 
decision made on the merits in a foreign court will be recognized and 
enforced in most situations,110 but fail in clarifying whether foreign 
judgments constitute res judicata.111 
Article eleven defines the exact scope of the Hague Convention’s 
treatment of damages.112 The text of paragraph one of article eleven 
makes it quite clear that damages awarded for anything other than an 
actual loss suffered can be refused in a foreign State under the Hague 
Convention.113 When taken in conjunction with paragraph two, article 
eleven firmly deals with the possibility of seeking any sort of damage 
beyond that needed to compensate the party for a loss. In the end, this 
means that parties seeking to enter an international contract will have 
no incentive to choose a forum that allocates attorney’s fees to the 
victor when the parties’ home States do not allow such awards. In 
addition, article fifteen removes any incentive parties may have to 
choose a forum for its generous awards because it allows severable 
parts of a foreign judgment to be recognized and enforced when the 






110 Id. art. 8(2); see also UNIDROIT Principles supra note 3, at 205 (expanding 
on the role of judicial review in civil law systems). Typically, judgments in the court 
of first instance in civil law systems are subject to a re-examination of the facts and 
the law, whereas in common law systems, the court of second instance is generally 
limited to a review of the law. Id. But see Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 42, at 
123 (contending that U.S. law does not readily distinguish between contested 
judgments and default judgments for the purposes of determining res judicata).  
111 See PETER R. BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: 
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 
(P.B. Carter ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (suggesting that there are two types of 
preclusive pleas that parties are typically allowed to make with a final foreign 
judgment). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. g 
(1988 Rev.) (conceding that it is uncertain whether U.S. courts will give foreign rules 
of privity the same treatment as that received by foreign judgments after recognition). 
112 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11 (lambasting the United States’ 
use of punitive damages by excluding them from recognition). 
113 Id. art. 11(1). 
114 Id. art. 15 (settling the question of whether a choice of court agreement in a 
contract with provisions ruled null and void can be severed in the affirmative). 
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B. Weaknesses in the Hague Convention Approach 
 
Even though the Hague Convention will provide a great deal of 
certainty in the currently confusing international business arena, it still 
has some shortcomings. First, by limiting its scope to civil and 
commercial matters, the Hague Convention does not affect 
international cases involving choice of court agreements that do not 
concern civil or commercial matters.115 Simply put, all of the benefits 
created by the Hague Convention in unifying the U.S. standard and 
ensuring a degree of reciprocity in foreign countries are inapplicable to 
any case that cannot be classified as civil or commercial. This gives 
rise to the second limitation on the Hague Convention—the lack of 
clarity as to what constitutes a civil or commercial matter due to the 
different legal systems of the member States.116 Article one does not 
define “civil or commercial matter,” leaving each foreign court with 
the discretion to determine whether a transaction is a “civil or 
commercial matter.” Therefore, a foreign State court rendering a 
judgment in an international case dealing with an exclusive choice of 
court agreement might classify the parties’ dispute as either a civil or a 
commercial matter. But the rendering court may find its decision 
thwarted by the enforcing court’s decision not to recognize the 




115 Id. art. 1 (limiting the Hague Convention to international cases involving 
choice of court agreements in civil or commercial matters).  
116 See Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, General Report Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE 
THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS 1, 12–14 (Gerhard Walter & 
Samuel P. Baumgartner eds., 2000) (discussing the difficulty English courts have had 
with the term “civil and commercial matters”). The courts of continental Europe, 
however, have little difficulty determining which matters fall under the scope of civil 
and commercial matters because they have a long history of distinguishing between 
public law and private law. Id. Most civil law nations will recognize and enforce a 
judgment they consider to be commercial or civil matters even if the original nation 
does not consider it as such. Id. 
117 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 23 (insisting that courts apply the 
Hague Convention with “regard…to its international character and the need to 
promote uniformity”); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 62, at 5 (referring to questions 
to be presented at the conference, including whether or not the Proposed Convention 
could succeed with the same amount of success as the Brussels Convention without 
some sort of international institution to regulate its application); cf. Volkswagenwerk 
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The Hague Convention also falls short because it allows “any 
other means of communication which renders information accessible 
so as to be usable for subsequent reference” to be used as evidence of 
an exclusive choice of court agreement.118 This provision could 
surprise a number of companies involved in international contracting 
that are unaware of the details of the Hague Convention. 
 These shortcomings, although important, do not completely 
undermine the benefits of the Hague Convention. Furthermore, as 
member States begin to ratify and apply the Convention, they will 
likely solve these problems—if the member States can meet again to 
try to reach consensus on the issues. Either way, the member States 
would be shortsighted not to ratify the Hague Convention, 
notwithstanding its shortcomings. 
 
C. The Hague Convention Will Not Require Drastic Changes 
 
The Hague Convention differs little from current U.S. law; 
therefore, Congress will not have to implement drastic changes to 
confirm the convention, though it will result in many benefits. The 
Hague Convention’s dual nature119 requires a two-step comparison of 
its provisions with the current recognition regimes to demonstrate 
clearly that ratifying the Hague Convention will not require drastic 
changes. First, this section compares the jurisdictional provisions of 
the Hague Convention with U.S. law on forum-selection clauses. 
Second, this section addresses the similarities and differences of the 
Hague Convention, and the three existing approaches on the 






                                                                                                          
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (interpreting the Hague 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters in a manner that permitted U.S. plaintiff to bypass the Hague 
Service Convention’s requirements for service abroad by mailing service of process to 
the foreign corporation’s domestic subsidiary). 
118 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(c)(ii). 
119 See discussion supra Part I.C (admitting that the Hague Convention has two 
principle purposes—to create jurisdiction through choice of court clauses and to 
guarantee the recognition of judgments in foreign countries). 




Given the United States’ respect for forum-selection clauses,120 
article five of the Hague Convention is not a far stretch from current 
U.S. law.121 In light of the Supreme Court decisions in Bremen v. 
Zapata122 and Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,123 which extend the 
obligatory reach of forum-selection clauses to include inconvenient 
forums when such an inconvenience was a factor in the parties’ 
negotiation, the Hague Convention’s exclusion of forum non 
conveniens as a defense is not troublesome.124 It is no different than 
what the U.S. Supreme Court held in Carnival Cruise Lines, in which 
the Court held a consumer to a forum-selection clause printed on the 
back of a form passenger contract even though the selected forum was 
far from the consumer’s home, and therefore, conceivably an 
inconvenient place for the consumer to pursue a claim.125 The Hague 
Convention deals only with international business contracts.126 Thus, it 
is safe to assume that both parties are negotiating at arm’s length in 
selecting a particular forum for litigation. The negotiating means that 
both parties have considered what acquiescing to a particular forum 
means for their overall negotiations and costs. In Carnival Cruise 
Lines, the Court clearly stated that a consumer’s benefit indirectly 
related to the forum-selection clause of the contract and was a factor 
weighing against dismissal of the claim on a forum non conveniens 
 
 
120 See discussion supra Part II.A (asserting that forum-selection clauses are 
generally accepted in the United States).  
121 Compare discussion supra Part II.A (delineating U.S. jurisprudence on 
forum-selection clauses and their enforceability), with discussion supra Part II.C 
(clarifying the impact of article five of the Hague Convention). 
122 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971) (enforcing an agreement 
between two “sophisticated” businesses to resolve disputes in the United Kingdom). 
123 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a form 
passage contract’s forum-selection clause between a consumer and a large 
corporation).  
124 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(2). 
125 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595 (holding that a forum-selection 
clause in a cruise line's passage contract ticket, requiring litigation of all disputes in 
Florida, was reasonable and enforceable because Florida was not a "remote alien 
forum"). 
126 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the Hague Convention, specifically 
articles 1 and 2, articles which limit the Hague Convention to international business 
contracts). 
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motion.127 Furthermore, the forum-selection clause upheld in Carnival 
Cruise Lines was not negotiated at arms length but was part of 
boilerplate language printed on the back of a ticket stub, giving even 
more weight to the evidence that an inconvenient forum is not contrary 
to U.S. jurisprudence. If we extend the Court’s logic from Bremen in 
forum-selection cases to Carnival Cruise Lines, it is reasonable to 
expect that the Supreme Court would not dismiss an international case 
between businesses arising from a choice of court agreement because 
both parties likely considered the convenience and costs of litigation in 
a variety of forums before agreeing to the contract.128 
A non-selected court’s decision to honor a choice of court 
agreement by dismissing a suit brought in an improper forum is as 
important to the function of choice of court agreements as the chosen 
court’s decision to adjudicate the parties’ dispute.129 Enacting article 
six of the Hague Convention would create only minor problems, if 
any, because it does not require U.S. courts to do anything more than 
consider the same factors for non-recognition of forum-selection 
clauses as set forth in Bremen. Thus, the Hague Convention serves the 
purpose of honoring forum-selection clauses just as well as U.S. 
courts’ current practice. 
 
2. Recognition: a limited national codification 
 
The U.S. Senate should ratify the Hague Convention because it 
allows judges to utilize the same factors in determining whether to 
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment as those currently permitted 
by the three bodies of law discussed in Part II.130 The three different 
approaches, while under different names, are substantially similar in 
 
 
127 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 592–95 (stressing the importance of 
considering the parties’ negotiated costs in determining whether a motion to dismiss 
on forum non conveniens was appropriate). 
128 See also Maier, supra note 15, at 60 (insisting that U.S. courts will enforce 
negotiated forum-selection clauses in international contracts after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carnival Cruise Lines). 
129 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 6 (requiring a court not selected to 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the case so that the Hague Convention will 
achieve its goal of unifying international practice). 
130 See discussion supra Part II.B.1–3 (elaborating on U.S. law governing the 
recognition of foreign judgments in the United States, including federal common law, 
the Restatement, and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act).  
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the way they treat the factors judges are required to consider in 
determining how to treat foreign judgments.131 
 A U.S. judge’s ability to refuse recognition and enforcement 
under either the Hague Convention or the current recognition and 
enforcement regimes undermines any argument that recognizing and 
enforcing judgments contrary to U.S. public policy, or those that fall 
short of due process standards, pose a serious problem.132  
The Hague Convention, once ratified and executed, would codify 
the federal common law factors for refusing recognition and 
enforcement and create a single national standard.133 A number of the 
Hague Convention’s key articles dealt with the requirements of the 
Hilton standard. It replaces the full and fair trial, as well as the 
neutrality requirements of Hilton with articles eight and nine.134 The 
Hague Convention specifically mentions the lack of procedural 
fairness as one reason for not recognizing a judgment.135 Paragraph 
two of article eight also guarantees a fair trial by allowing the 




131 See supra note 45and accompanying text (viewing the three as substantially 
similar). See generally discussion supra Part II.B.1–3 (articulating the requirements 
set forth by each of the approaches for the recognition of foreign judgments in the 
United States). 
132 See Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (reviewing the basic exceptions to U.S. recognition law that prevent U.S. 
courts from recognizing foreign judgments when they are a matter of foreign tax or 
penal law). The court relies on a decision by Judge Learned Hand in which he 
specifies the reasons for U.S. courts to refuse recognition of revenue rulings of other 
nations. Id. at 1164. According to Judge Learned Hand, such rulings should be beyond 
the power of the court because they affect “matters as vital to [the nation’s] existence 
as its criminal laws.” Id.  
133 See infra note 147 and accompanying text (restating the impact on the states 
of the Supremacy Clause in applying a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate and signed by 
the President). 
134 Compare Hague Convention, supra note 5, arts. 8–9 (establishing the 
grounds for both recognition and non-recognition), with discussion supra Part II.B.1–3 
(reviewing the grounds for recognition and non-recognition under U.S. law). 
135 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 9(e). 
136 Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 8(2) (“The court addressed shall be 
bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless 
the judgment was given by default.”). This provision is contrary to current U.S. civil 
procedure practice. In the United States, the Constitution’s full faith and credit clause 
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The Hague Convention also promotes the fair treatment of foreign 
parties in an original suit based on a forum-selection clause because 
unfair treatment of a foreign party in that case would lead to the denial 
of recognition—a consequence that penalizes the judgment creditor 
and stigmatizes the court that permitted the unfair treatment.137   
The Hague Convention deals with the federal common law’s 
reciprocity requirement enunciated in Hilton by equally applying the 
convention to every contracting State.138 This ensures that courts of 
member States will consider recognizing and enforcing U.S. 
judgments within the scope of the Hague Convention’s articles instead 
of declining to recognize them due to non-reciprocity.139 In light of the 
comity considerations regarding foreign laws, parties to the original 
suit and legal commentators cannot expect a treaty that specifically 
allows for the refusal of recognition upon certain grounds to guarantee 
recognition and enforcement in every case.140 At the very least, the 
Hague Convention establishes a mandatory framework for every 
contracting State to use when considering such issues.141 
 
D. The ALI Proposed Statute and the Specter of Reciprocity 
 
The ALI’s decision to reintroduce reciprocity as a requirement for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the proposed 
federal statute as an incentive for other States to negotiate an 
agreement with the United States regarding recognition is contrary to 
                                                                                                          
precludes an enforcing court from examining the merits of a case when the rendering 
court entered judgment by default. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
137 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 9(e) (“Recognition or enforcement 
may be refused if: recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with 
the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the specific 
proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of 
procedural fairness of that State.”). 
138 See infra note 141. 
139 See supra notes 3, 41 (highlighting the inequity that U.S. judgment creditors 
face in enforcing a judgment abroad because of reciprocity requirements in other 
countries). 
140 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (announcing the different grounds 
upon which a court can refuse to recognize a foreign judgment under the Hague 
Convention). 
141 See generally Hague Convention, supra note 5 (creating an international 
framework for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of member States, and the 
recognition of judgments based on a court’s exercise of jurisdiction in foreign 
countries). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
72 
the majority of U.S. recognition jurisprudence, and it ignores the need 
for a predictable recognition regime.142  
Judgment creditors seeking recognition of a foreign judgment in 
the United States benefit from the three approaches’ liberal treatment 
of foreign judgments.  The three approaches reduce the necessity of re-
litigating and hinder a judgment debtor’s ability to avoid 
enforcement.143 A liberal approach is also beneficial because it 
conserves judicial resources.144 Reinstating reciprocity as a 
requirement would undermine this liberal approach and change the 
nature of rights awarded to judgment creditors. The concept of res 
judicata as applied by U.S. courts specifies that a final judgment 
between parties bestows certain rights upon the judgment creditor.145 
A reciprocity requirement negates these rights by denying a judgment 
creditor, typically a private citizen or corporation, the means to 
enforce these rights when the judgment creditor is a citizen of a 
country that does not guarantee the reciprocal treatment of U.S. 
judgments. It is not fair to say that a successful litigant’s right to a 
money judgment should depend upon U.S. relations with the creditor’s 
home country.146 However, theoretically, each signatory of the Hague 
 
 
142 See FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, supra note 82, § 7 cmt. b (voicing the opinion 
of the ALI that requiring reciprocity as a precondition to the recognition of a foreign 
judgment is not only in line with the practice of many countries, but would act as an 
incentive for other countries to negotiate agreements with the United States to 
guarantee the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions flowing from that 
country).  
143 See supra Parts II.B, III.B.1–2 (explaining how recognizing a foreign 
judgment as res judicata reduces re-litigation); Miller, supra note 107, at 287–89 
(explaining that forcing a foreign judgment creditor to relitigate a case that has already 
been concluded by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction is a waste of both the 
foreign litigant and the court’s resources).  
144 See supra note 143. 
145 Homer D. Schaaf, The Recognition of Judgments from Foreign Countries: A 
Federal-State Clause for an International Convention, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 379, 381–
82 (1966) (advancing the belief that the reciprocity rule from Hilton was, and 
continues to be, disfavored because it violates the principles of res judicata by forcing 
parties from certain States to relitigate). 
146 See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 
(N.Y. 1926) (construing the question of recognizing foreign judgments as a matter of 
private law rather than public international law, an issue of private right rather than 
public relations in its decision to enforce a French judgment, and in its disregard of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hilton that required reciprocity as a condition of 
recognition and enforcement in the United States). 
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Convention on Choice of Court Agreements would use the Convention 
guidelines in determining when to recognize a foreign judgment. This 
most likely will result in a form of reciprocity that is not as strict as the 
ALI provision, but nonetheless, provides for some uniformity in the 




The U.S. Senate should ratify the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements because it will nationalize the standard for 
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments within the United States 
and promote the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad. However, in 
legislating a statute to execute the Hague Convention, the U.S. 
Congress should look to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act 
as a model and not the ALI proposed federal statute. 
 
A. National Standard for Recognition and Enforcement 
 
By ratifying the Hague Convention, the U.S. Senate would create 
a national standard for the enforcement of forum-selection clauses and 
the recognition of foreign judgments, assuming the President signs the 
treaty.147 Implementing a national standard would benefit foreign 
judgment creditors by reducing their confusion in deciding where to 
seek enforcement. In fact, a number of courts and commentators have 
suggested that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
in the United States should be a question of federal law because, 




147 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that all Treaties made under the 
Authority of the United States are binding upon every state and judge because they are 
the supreme law of the land); see also Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 
1986) (explaining that a treaty ratified after enactment of an inconsistent federal 
statute is controlling in a discussion of the Hague Service Convention). However, the 
court noted that when the Hague Service Convention is silent on a matter, federal law 
governs. Id. 
148 See John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Affairs, 1965 DUKE L. J. 
248, 258, 261–75 (arguing that the court in Johnston evaded applying the federal 
common law established in Hilton by characterizing the recognition of foreign 
judgments as a matter of private rights instead of a matter of foreign relations not 
because the Johnston court believed state law should control, but because the Hilton 
rule’s use of reciprocity was unpopular despite the fact that the Constitution 
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B. U.S. Judgments Abroad 
 
Ratifying the Hague Convention would also benefit U.S. litigants 
seeking the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad by 
establishing an international mechanism for recognition of a particular 
class of judgments.149 Instead of forcing U.S. judgment creditors to 
prove U.S. law in a foreign court, the Hague Convention would ensure 
that their case is not questioned on the merits or relitigated so long as 
it falls within the scope of the Convention. 
U.S. businesses entering into international business contracts tend 
to rely on the New York Convention for resolving international 
disputes.150 While this method may be effective, the lack of an 
international convention governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments hinders the United States’ ability to protect businesses 
incorporated in the United States and discourages the continued flow 
of foreign direct investment into the United States.151 If U.S. 
businesses could conclude a choice of court agreement that designated 
a U.S. court without the fear of having to relitigate in a foreign 
                                                                                                          
“contemplates exclusive federal control over foreign affairs”); Schaaf, supra note 145, 
at 389 (questioning the validity of states’ decisions to localize the law on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment on the premise that Congress’ power 
to regulate activity of the states includes public international law, but it does not 
include private international law); see also Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 
885, 892 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (admitting that state law controls the recognition of foreign 
judgments, but questioning the reliance upon unclear state recognition jurisprudence 
considering that the recognition of foreign judgments is also a matter of U.S. foreign 
affairs); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (iterating the 
importance of relying upon comity in recognition actions instead of denying 
recognition on comity grounds because of the decision’s impact upon international 
relations). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 10; art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3; art. II, §§ 
2, 3; art. III, § 2; art. VI, cl. 2 (providing the means as well as the authority of the 
federal government to control the foreign relations of the United States).  
149 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 8(1) (“A judgment given by a court 
of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be 
recognized and enforced in other Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter. 
Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in this 
Convention.”). 
150 See Park, supra note 1, at 4, 29 (claiming that U.S. businesses, at least those 
run by sophisticated managers rely on arbitration clauses to ensure the enforcement of 
their successful arbitration awards). 
151 See also supra Part II.B (reviewing the majority of states’ decisions to omit 
reciprocity as a requirement for recognition in both the Restatement and the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act). 
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country, U.S. businesses would almost certainly take advantage of the 
option.152 
 
C. Using the Uniform Act as a Model 
 
The next issue to consider is whether the U.S. Congress should 
adopt the ALI’s proposed federal statute as a means of executing the 
Hague Convention. The U.S. Congress should not model its 
implementing legislation on the ALI’s proposed federal statute 
because it resurrects the reciprocity requirement.153 The proposed 
federal statute would leave the United States in the same position as 
before with the U.S. offering a substantially more liberal approach to 
enforcing foreign judgments while other nations would deny U.S. 
judgments because of conflicts in jurisdictional practices and damage 
awards.154   
Instead of enacting a federal statute modeled on the ALI proposed 
statute, the U.S. Congress should adapt the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act to the Hague Convention.155 After 
restricting its application to international cases based on exclusive 
choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters, 
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act would be 
well suited to this task since it already has a great deal in common 
with the other U.S. approaches to the recognition of foreign 
judgments, and—most importantly—the Hague Convention.156  
Commentators’ fears about the lack of reciprocity in the Hague 
Convention are unfounded. The Hague Convention would guarantee 
 
 
152 See Park, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that businesses need certainty to 
prepare pricing strategies and long-term business plans). 
153 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (establishing that the Foreign 
Judgments Act would include the recognition of foreign judgments in issues outside 
the scope of the Hague Convention such as tort claims). 
154 See discussion supra Part II.D. and III.C (denouncing the use of the ALI’s 
proposed federal statute as a model for implementing the Hague Convention).  
155 See generally UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 
U.L.A. 274 (1986) (controlling the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
in thirty-two of the fifty states).  
156 See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (determining that the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition act and the Hague Convention address the recognition 
of foreign judgments in a similar manner after comparing the recognition and 
enforcement regimes embodied in federal common law, the Restatement, and the 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition act with the Hague Convention). 
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reciprocity among States that have already ratified it.157 This type of 
"guaranteed” reciprocity as provided for in the Hague Convention 
would allow for a predictable system of foreign judgment recognition 
and enforcement in the United States as provided for in the Hague 
Convention.  It will also replace the current system still used by some 
states, where recognition and enforcement is determined by U.S. 
foreign relations. Understanding that the Hague Convention began as a 
much larger project helps put its ratification in the right perspective. 
The Hague Convention is a stepping-stone on the path that leads to the 
creation of an international agreement on jurisdiction and the 
recognition of all foreign judgments. 
 
D. After the Hague Convention 
 
The United States should take advantage of the Hague 
Convention’s success in creating an international consensus by 
continuing negotiations with other countries, not just members of the 
Hague Conference. The Hague Convention seems to support such a 
decision by allowing any other country to accede to its provisions.158 
Allowing other nations to join the Hague Convention without 
renegotiating will increase its application and usefulness world-wide. 
If ratifying the Hague Convention means that a U.S. business could 
enforce the judgment of a court in any member State in another State 
where the judgment debtor’s assets are located, and the number of 
countries where enforcement is possible enlarges, arguments against 
ratification seem doomed to fail. 
 Paragraph four of article twenty-six of the Hague Convention 
specifically permits member countries to conclude a bilateral treaty 
affecting the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments so 
long as judgments are not recognized to a lesser degree.159 Bilateral 
 
 
157 See generally Hague Convention, supra note 5 (creating a binding 
international treaty among the member States once it is ratified by each in turn). 
158 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 27(3) (permitting any country to 
accede to the Hague Convention, even those not members of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law). 
159 See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 26(4) (embracing the attempts of 
countries to build on the Hague Convention by explicitly allowing two countries that 
are already parties to the Convention to negotiate subsequent treaties on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as long as foreign judgments are 
not recognized “to a lesser extent than under this Convention”). 
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negotiations with other nations would allow the United States to 
construct agreements to the needs and goals of both nations instead of 
trying to carve out small areas of consensus in multilateral 
negotiations. When taken together, the provision on accession and 
paragraph four of article twenty-six would allow the United States to 
enter into bilateral agreements on the recognition of foreign judgments 





Conclusion of the Hague Convention earlier this year marked the 
success of the United States in negotiating a multilateral treaty on 
limited jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgments. In many 
respects, the current U.S. approach to recognizing foreign judgments is 
similar to the approach taken by the Hague Convention. The 
ratification of the Hague Convention would serve the interests of the 
United States by creating a uniform system that courts can use to 
determine when to recognize foreign judgments. Ratifying the Hague 
Convention would also protect the interests of U.S. businesses abroad 
as they attempt to enforce judgments in foreign jurisdictions. Without 
question, the Hague Convention would be a significant step forward 
for the United States. 
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